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The Refusal of Blood Transfusions by
Jehovah's Witnesses 
( Continued from February 1955 LIN ACRE QUARTE
RLY)
JoHN C. FoRD, S.J. 
Ill. LEGAL LIABILITY
WHEN p
hysicians or hospital 
autho r i t ie s have under­
taken the care of a Jehovah's Wit­
ness, or the child of a Witness,'
embarrassing legal dilemmas may
arise. Particularly trying are those 
cases in which the Witness refuses 
for self or child a tr an sfu s i o n
which is judged to be imperatively
needed to prevent imminent death.
A series of hypotheses can be 
imagined. One can inquire about
criminal or civil liability or both;
about the case of the adult or the 
case of the child; about the case 
where the transfusion i� given or
where it is omitted; about the case
where there has been an explicit
agreemerit not to give a transfu­
sion, or the case where no such
agreement exists; about the case 
· where the patient survives and re­
s�nts the transfusion, or the case
where he dies because the transfu­
sion was omitted, or even where
he dies as a result of a surgical
accident connected with the trans­
fusion itself. By combining these 
suppositions in various ways, and
including cases where the surviv­
ing relatives take civil action or 
attempt criminal complaints, one
can imagine a large number of
hypothetical legal problems . A fur-
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ther twist could be introduced by
supposing that the doctor himself
is a Jehovah's Witness, who by
his advice abets the patient in his 
refusal of a transfusion, or, espe­
cially, abets the parent who refuses 
it for a young child.
It is not my intention or my prov­
ince to try to solve all the laby­
rinthine ins-and-outs of these prob­
lems. The attempt would be un­
duly speculative anyway, seeing
that precedents in the form of ac­
tually decided cases are hard to
find. I mention the possibilities in
order to illustrate the multiplicity
of the legal problems that could
conceivably arise. My present pur­
pose is merely to -recall some gen­
erally admitted legal pr inc iple s 
which are apr_opos, and to make
some general suggestions, leaving
it to the individual physician or 
hospital to get professional advice 
when faced with an actual dilemma.
A recent article has reviewed
the state of the law on "Criminal
Liability in Faith Healing."11
 This
interesting essay deals not only
with faith-healing cases strictly so­
called, but also with cases involv-
11 C. C. Cawley in 39 Minnesota Law
Review, 48-74 ( Dec. 1954) 41 
ing Christian Scientists and J eho­
vah' s Witnesses. Although it does 
not touch on the specific problems 
of physicians' l iab i lity, some of 
its conclusions are instructive for 
our purposes, es pecia l ly where 
chi ldren are made to suffer for 
their parents' beliefs. 
One of the principles now estab­
lished is that a parent who fails to 
provide necessary medical care for 
his child can be held criminally 
liable. "Since the turn of the cen­
tury, then, it has been well estab­
lished that a parent commits a mis­
demeanor when, due to religious 
belief, he denies his sick child the 
medical aid required by statute, 
and that, if the child consequently 
dies, the parent is liable for man­
slaughter." 12 Faith-healing de­
fendants appeal in vain to the reli­
gious freedom clauses of the First 
Amendment. The Supreme Court 
of the United States in the famous 
Mormon p olyg a my case stated: 
"Laws are made for the govern­
ment of actions, and while they 
cannot interfere with mere religious 
belief and opinions, they may with 
practices. Suppose one believed 
that human sacrifices were a neces­
sc1ry part of r eligious worship, 
would it be seriously contended 
that the civil government under 
which he lived could not interfere 
to prevent a sacrifice?" 13 
It is anomalous that in the 
12 Loe. cit., p. 57, citing three leading 
cases: For England, Reg. v. Senior, 1 
Q.B. Div. 283, 19 Cox C.C. 219 
( 1899). For Canada, Reg. v. Lewis, 
6. Ont. L. Rep. 132, 1 B.R.C. 732
( 1903). For the United States, People
vs. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201. 68  N.E.
243 (1903).
13 Reynolds vs. United States, 98 U.S. 
145 (1878). 
42 
United States the pastor or rel -
gious leader who abets a parent i.1 
the criminal neglect of the child ;3 
apparently not held liable. "It - , 
clear," says Cawley, "that in Car. -
ada, criminal liability attaches t ) 
the pastor or other adult who ac -
tively counsels a parent agaim t 
furnishing his child with necessar 
medical care .... I submit that her : 
is the glaring anomaly in our law 
that the parent who denies a chilc 
medical aid is punished, while th· 
pastor who counsels that denia 
goes free." 14 
It would not be legitimate to in 
fer, howeve r, that a physic i ar 
would be equally free from crim­
inal liability. Once he has under­
taken the care of the child he ha: 
affirmative duties in its regard. anc 
for him to advise and abet parents 
in their neglect of necessary care 
would put him in a position very 
different legally, it seems to me, 
from that of the pastor. 
It must be confessed, however, 
that as far as giving or omitting a 
· blood transfusion is concerned, the
physician seems to be caught in a
conflict of legal obligations. He is
obliged not to undertake a surgical
procedure, even if he judges it nec­
essary, without the parents' con­
sent. This rule is so clearly estab­
lished that it needs no elaboration.
On the other· hand, is he not
obliged to give a blood transfusion
which is desperately needed, when
the parents who refuse to provide
it are guilty of criminal neglect?
But then, in doing so, he is really
taking it upon himself to decide
two questions which in a given
case, or in a given jurisdiction,
14 Loe. cit., p. 72 and p. 74.
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might be open to dispute:  the 
question of fact: "Is this trans­
fusion absolutely necessary?", and 
the question of law: "Is this trans­
fusion part of the reasonable medi­
cal care which the law requires 
parents ( and others) to provide?" 
And finally, as mentioned above, 
he would be violating the well­
established rule that to operate 
without consent is to be guilty of 
assault and battery. 
In this dilemma it would seem 
that the physician's only complete 
legal security is in a court order 
empowering him to go ahead with, 
the transfusion even against the 
parents' wishes. But in the absence 
of such an order, in a clear-cut 
desperate case, I should imagine 
that a physician would have little 
to fear legally from giving the 
transfusion. It does not seem likely 
that he would be made to suffer 
legally if he could show that the 
life of the child was really at stake, 
and that the parents' refusal of a 
transfusion const i tu ted  criminal 
neglect on their part. But conceiv­
ably it might involve him in a 
troublesome and expensive litiga­
tion. 
It is all very well to hold the 
· parents for manslaughter if the
child dies, but is there not available
some legal means of preventing the
tragedy? In Chicago, in 1951, in
the case of the child Cheryl Linn
Labrenz, the courts found a meth­
od of circumventing the persistent
refusal of the parents. A petition
wa� filed in Family Court to the
effect that the child was dependent
because of lack of parental care
and guardianship. The Chief Pro­
bation Officer was appointed guar-
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dian with the right to consent to 
necessary blood t r ansfusions. 
These were given and the child's 
life was saved. Cawley describes 
the appeal to the doctrine of parens
patriae in this Illinois case, and in 
similar cases in Texas, Missouri, 
and New York.15 Sometimes, how­
ever, the legal machinery creaks 
and cannot be put into effect with 
sufficient dispatch to save the 
child.16 
If I may be allowed to make 
some suggestions regarding cases 
involving children, I would stress 
the following points: 
It is legally inadvisable to make 
any agreement or contract with a 
parent not to give a necessary 
blood transfusion to a child. As 
was stated above, in Part II, this 
would also be open to moral ob­
jections. 
The only complete legal security 
for physicians and hospital author­
ities who would give a transfusion 
contrary to the parents' w i s h  e_ s 
would be in a court order. Conse-
15 Loe. cit., p. 57 ff., citing: People ex 
rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 
104 N.E. 2nd 769 (1952); Mitchell vs. 
Davis, et al, 205 S.W. 2nd 812 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1947); Morrison vs. State, 
252 S.W. 2nd 97 (Mo. App. 1952); in 
re Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S. 2nd 63 (Chil­
dren's Court, Erie County, 1954). For 
a discussion of this last case, and fur­
ther references to the decided cases, 
see "Recent Cases" in 39 Minnesota Law Review, 118-122 (Dec. 1954). 
See also "Comment: Custody and 
Control of Children," 5 Fordham Law 
Review. 460 (1936). In a Washington 
case, where the sur\'.Jery itself involved -
serious danger to the child, the court 
refused to intervene: In re Hudson, 13 
Wash. 2nd 673, 126 P. 2nd 765 ( 1942). 
16 Cawley, lac. cit., p. 62, gives the de­
tails of the Grzyb case in Chicago, Jan. 1954. 
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quently those concerned should
familiarize themselves w i t h the
available legal procedures in their
own jurisdiction, and get legal ad­
vice ahead of time on the method
of obtaining such an order as
quickly as possible should the
need arise. 
When the case is desperate,
and no order has been obtained,
it would appear that there is not
much to fear by way of legal lia­
bility in giving the transfusion.
And considerations of charity for
the neglected c h i 1 d may well
weigh the balance in favor of
transfusion. But one should get
competent legal advice on each
case as it occurs. 
The case of the adult Witness
who refuses consent for an imper­
atively necessary transfusion, does
not cause such troublesome com­
plications. The law seems to allow
an adult to run risks with his own
life which he may not take with
the life of his minor child. In a
Supreme Court decision we read: 
"The right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to
expose the community or the child
to communicable disease or the 
latter to ill health or death. . ..
Parents may be  free to  become
martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow they are free, in iden­
tical circumstances, to make mar­
tyrs of their children .. . " 1 7 And
Cawley remarks: "Society and the
courts seem to say: 'We are de­
termined that a child shall grow
up safely and in good health to
maturity, and we will intervene
17 Rutledge, J., in Prince v. Mass 321U.S. 158, 167 (1944). Quotation of thisp�ssa11e does not indicate agreementwith the decision in the case.
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when his life or health is threa :­
ened by his parent's r.eligious "r
other eccentricities. But havir g
taken the trouble so to see hi n
into manhood, why, if ·he ther -
after chooses foolishly to endai -
ger his own life-and does not .. tthe same time endanger others, -
then we wash our h a n d s , f
him.' .. 18 
In some jurisdictions attemptE :1
suicide is a crime, and one w} J 
aids and abets a suicide or an a -
tempt at suicide is criminally l -
able. But there are no cases, aJ -
parently, to show that an adu t
who refuses a particular surgic; I
procedure, considered by phys -
cians to be necessary to preve1 t
death, is guilty of the crime of a• ..
tempted suicide. Indeed, the dil -
ference between taking affirmativ:
action on purpose to destroy one·;
own life. and merely refusing t >
make use of a highly techniecd
surgical means of preserving it, i,
a very obvious one. And it wouk.
be far-fetched indeed, to imagin,�
that a physician who failed t,,
transfuse could be held criminall 
liable on any theory of aidinp
and abetting attempted suicide
whether his failure stemmed fron
sympathy with the patient's be·
liefs, or from the patient's refusai
to permit the transfusion.
The patient's consent is required
before a physician may legally
perform any surgical operation 
"Operation without consent is a
trespass. It constitutes a technical
assault and renders the operatin9
surgeon liable.'' 10 And when the
is Loe. cit., p. 69.
19 Louis J. Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Law, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1949, p. 58. 
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adult patient who is in his right 
mind resolutely refuses to consent 
and positively forbids the opera­
tion, the physician is absolutely 
obliged, leg ally. to  respect his 
wishes. The patient's persistence 
may result in his death, but I have 
not been able to find any authority 
for the statement that the physi­
cian would incur either criminal 
or civil liability by his failure to 
force a transfusion or other sur­
gical procedure on an unwilling 
patient even in these extreme cir­
cumstances.20 
If surgeons do not dare to. 
transfuse a child in the face of the 
parents' refusal. and have to re­
sort to the cumbersome device of 
a court order for legal protection, 
even with the child at the point of 
death, it seems very unlikely that 
they will expose themselves to le­
gal liability by not transfusing a 
recalcitrant adult, who, being of 
right mind, positively forbids the 
operation. Given a case of acute 
appendicitis with extreme danger 
of death, and a patient who in his 
right mind resolutely refuses sur­
gery, there is only one thing for 
the doctor to do: omit the sur­
gery and take what measures he 
can to save the patient's life. The 
· same thing is true of adult trans­
fusion cases.
There does not seem to be any
legal machinery by which a court
order can be obtained to empower
a physician to operate on an un­
willing adult or by which surgical
20 There is a Massachusetts case in which
the court held that where a patient re­
fused to have an x-ray taken, the phy­
sician was not responsible for the con­
sequences of the patient's own want of 
care. Carey vs. Mercer, 239 Mass. 
599, 132 N.E. 353 ( 1921). 
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treatment can be forced on him. 
In my opinion this is as it should 
be. The bodily integrity of an in­
dividual should enjoy a very high 
degree of immunity from invasion 
by public authority, as will be as­
serted below. This is especially 
true when conscientious convic­
tions are at stake. 
Although the physician incurs 
no liability by omitting the trans­
fusion, yet he may not be in a po­
sition to prove that the consent 
was actually refused. If the pa­
tient dies and his survivors want 
to make trouble, they may be able 
to do so unless the physician can 
produce something in writing- to 
show that consent was refused. If 
a physician decides to undertake 
the care of a patient who makes 
a stipulation or is likely to make a 
stipulation against blood transfu­
sions, it would be wise for him to 
protect himself by a written, wit­
nessed order from the patient to 
that effect, together with a written 
release from all liability in case 
the lack of transfusion results in 
harm or death to the patient. One 
should have professional legal ad­
vice in formulating such an agree­
ment and release. 
Should physicians and hospi­
tals, then, simply refuse to under­
take the care of a patient who re­
jects or is likely to reject a blood 
transfusion on religious grounds? 
Obstetrical cases off er a special 
difficulty _since even though one 
acceded to the reques t  not to 
transfuse the mother, it seems le­
gally inadvisable and morally im­
proper to make such an agree�ent 
regardin!;J her baby. I dou?t 1f a
universal answer can be given to 
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the question either for the obstet­
rical or for other cases. In some 
cases the future need of transfu­
sion is so likely that it would be 
foolish to undertake the case and 
at the same time· deprive oneself 
of an essential element for suc­
cessful treatment. I doubt, how­
ever, whether a physician's repu­
tation ( or the hospital's) would 
suffer to any extent if a patient 
is lost through his own refusal of 
a transfusion. But it is not an 
easy thing to have to stand by 
with hands tied while one's own 
patient makes a martyr of himself 
on such flimsy grounds. On the 
other hand where will the thou­
sands of Witnesses get medical 
· care if everyone refuses to have
anything to do with them? It
seems to me that acute dilemmas
are going to be sufficiently unus­
ual and infrequent so that it would
be too drastic to refuse all Wit­
nesses because of the relatively
few desperate cases likely to even­
tuate. Witnesses may often start
by refusing. But under the pres­
sure of imminent death many will
doubtless find their native common
sense triumphing over their pecu­
liar religious indoctrination.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY
It is obvious from the foregoing 
that general questions of State 
power arise whenever there is a 
conflict or an apparent conflict be­
tween what the individual's con­
science may demand of him, and 
what the public good or the rights 
of other individuals may require. 
These are the questions of "pub­
lic policy" referred to here. The 
general question of Church and 
State and religious freedom is too 
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large for our discussion. I inten I 
to speak of public policy only i 1 
relation to blood transfusions an l 
closely related matters. 
My reason for discussing th:: 
aspect of the matter at all is the.: 
I consider it important to defen , 
and support the view that it i; 
good public policy to concede t
the State the power to give a ne 
essary blood transfusion to a chilr 
against the sincere but erroneou 
religious convictions of the parent 
and that it is bad public policy t< 
concede to the State the right tc 
force an adult to take this mean1 
of staying alive against his owr 
sincere religious convictions. 
It would be considerably easier 
to determine these questions of 
public policy if we lived in a so­
ciety in which the great mass of 
the citizens were all in agreement 
as to the requirements of the nat­
ural moral law and of the positive 
laws of God. For in such a case 
there would at least be no  conflict 
between the laws of the State and 
the objective law of God. But 
even in such a society one would 
still have to contend with the in­
dividual erroneous conscience. 
One would still have to uphold 
the right of the individual to fol­
low such a conscience when he 
sincerely believed that not to do 
so would be a sin off ending God. 
And in practical cases one would 
still have the task of determining 
when a religious practice based on 
an erroneous idea of the will of 
God was so harmful to the com­
mon good or so contrary to the 
rights of other individuals that it 
had to be restrained. 
In the society we live in there 
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is no such general agreement as to 
the requirements of the objective 
moral law. Catholics believe that 
from reason and revelation they 
are in possession of those moral 
truths by which we are expected 
to conform ourselves to the will 
of God. And this belief is based 
partially on the more fundamental 
one that the Catholic Church was 
founded by Chris( who is the Son 
of God, and that this Church has 
power to teach authoritatively in 
matters of faith and morals. Ob­
viously these b e 1 i e f s are not 
shared by the majority of ·our cit­
izens. It might seem at first sight 
therefore, a rather hopeless task 
to try to formulate a statement of 
public policy which would be con­
sistent with Catholic teaching, ac­
cep_table to the mass of citizens 
and capable of being put into 
practical effect. 
But the situation is not as bad 
as it seems. We have a common 
her i t age of Judeo-Chris t ian 
thought which still pervades many 
of our political institutions and 
much .of our national thinking. 
There would be quite general 
agreement, in the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, that the State should be 
allowed to interfere with the indi­
vidual liberty as little as possible. 
And very few would object to the 
doctrine that the State must be 
empowered to protect the lives of 
its citizens, especially young chil­
dren, against fantastic religious 
aberrations. It is not impossible, 
when people agree on general 
principles such as these, to achieve 
a considerable measure of agree­
ment on practical problems of 
public concern as to the life and 
health of the people. On the great 
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majority of such problems we can 
hope to arrive at practical norms 
agreeable to the mass of the citi­
zens and not at variance with the, 
objective moral law. Exceptions 
should be of infrequent occur­
rence. 
It is the task of moralists and 
lawmakers, then, to try to draw a 
practical line which will delimit 
the powers of the State and the 
rights of the individual.-a line 
which will protect against reli­
gious fanaticism .and at the same 
time do justice to natural law 
principles and to sincere religious 
convictions whether erroneous or 
not. 
At the outset, in drawing· this 
line, two mistakes at opposite ex­
tremes are to be avoided. The first 
exaggerates State power. The 
second exaggerates individual lib­
erty. 
State p o w e r  is exaggerated 
when one subscribes to the propo­
sition that any interference by the 
State can be justified as long as 
the majority opinion approves. To 
make public policy a mere func­
tion of the will of the majority 
reduces it in the last analysis to 
some form of the doctrine that 
might makes right. Such thinking 
was utterly foreign to the found­
ing fathers of the American re­
public. But it has found some· 
modern adherents both on the 
philosophical and practical level. 
They reduce law to the organized 
force of the majority that stands 
behind it. They use the words 
"undemocratic" and "divisive" to 
describe those who dissent from 
majority views. 
Democracy does not mean that 
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the majority is right. Majority 
rule is a practical way of making 
a republic work. If it were true 
that mere force of numbers made 
the difference between right and 
wrong, good and bad, then mere 
force would be controlling. Might 
would make right. But if anything 
is clear in the fundamental polit­
ical thought of our country, it is 
the idea that minorities have a 
right to exist and to propagate 
their ideas. It was a minority that 
thought slavery wrong and finally 
abolished it. Right and wrong are 
not determined by a show of 
hands. They are determined by a 
show of minds. 
Now one may take the view­
- point of the practical statesman, 
that in our system the holders of 
minority views must be protected 
( within limits) whether they are 
right or wrong, and that it is hard 
to say which is which. Or one 
may take the viewpoint of the 
Catholic moralist who claims to 
know· what is right and demands 
protection for the minority view 
when it is right, and for the er-
- roneous conscience ( again within
limits) when it is wrong. But in
both cases the principle of individ­
ual liberty is safeguarded against
invasion by mere majority might.
In both cases it is possible to
arrive at practical formulations
largely agreeable to both view­
points.
The mistake at the opposite ex­
treme is to imagine that any prac­
tice, no matter how immoral, or
ridiculous, or dangerous must be 
tolerated in the interests of indi­
vidual liberty if it is based on
sincere religious belief. The ex-
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ample of · human sacrifices men 
tioned above in Reynolds vs. th. -
United States speaks for itself. 
One may assert further, wit) 
varying degrees of assurance, tha 
the State can and ought to pre 
vent the Hindu widow from cast 
ing herself on her husband's fu. 
neral pyre; or the Japanese off i 
cer from committing hara-kiri; o 
a?yone at all from committing sui ode; or the Mormon from prac 
ticing polygamy; or the evangeli 
cal fanatic from exposing other: 
to snakebite; or the Christian Sci 
el)tist from neglecting ordinar' 
medical care for a dangerously 
sick child; or a Hindu from goinc 
about unvaccinated in an epidemi: 
because he has religious scruplet 
about using cows to produce vac­
cine, or a Church congregatior 
from conducting services when 
quarantine has been imposed tc 
safeguard the public health. 
But it is to be noted of all thes� 
examples that the justification ol 
State interference is based on ur­
gent considerations of the public 
good, or the imperative need to 
protect some individual person's 
right to life and health. The prin­
ciple that the State should inter­
fere as little as possible with indi­
vidual liberty, especially where 
bodily integrity is involved, and 
most of all where conscience is 
affronted, is acceptable to most 
legislators and, I am sure, to 
all Catholic philosophers. 0 n 1 y 
strong, clear. reasons of the com­
mon good, or the clear necessity 
of pr?tecting the rights of others. especially d efenseless children 
can justify State intervention i� 
such cases. Catholics, being them­
selves a minority group, are espe-
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cially jealous of their rights in 
this regard and especially loath to 
concede to the State a power of 
i n t e r v e n ti o n  which might be 
turned against them. 
What then of public policy 
where the conscientious refusal of 
blood' transfusions is concerned? 
Having put the problem in its phil­
osophical setting, _ where should 
that practical line be drawn to de­
limit State power and protect in­
dividual liberty in this fiield? My 
opinion and the reasons for it can 
now be briefly recapitulated. 
The State should not be em­
powered to force a transfusion on 
an adult Witness who is in his 
right mind and who, because of 
his religious convictions, refuses 
it. First, because this would be 
an ·unwarranted invasion of his 
rights of conscience. The State 
cannot show that interference with 
individual liberty in such a case is 
justified. There is involved here 
no urgent need of protecting the 
common good, no pressing neces­
sity of protecting the rights of 
others. 
Secondly, for the W i t n e s s ,  
given his frame of mind, the use 
of a blood transfusion is an ex­
traordinary means of preserving 
life to which he is not objectively 
obliged by the moral law. This 
·was the tentative opinion de­
fended in Part IL above. The
State should certainly not be em­
powered to force an individual to
make use of a surgical procedure
to save his own life, when the
moral law itself does not oblige
him, in the circumstances, to do
so. If the moral law leaves him
free to risk his life to that extent,
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the State should leave him free 
also. 
Thirdly, if one takes the other 
view and considers that a trans­
fusion is an ordinary means even 
for a conscientious objector, one 
should still deny the right of the 
State to intervene. The State is 
not competent to enforce every 
aspect of the moral law. The line 
between ordinary and extraordi­
nary means of self-preservation is 
finely drawn and hard to deter­
mine. Can we allow the State, in 
the absence of urgent considera­
tions of public good or the rights 
of others, to become the moral ar­
biter, with power to encroach up­
on the bodily integrity of the citi­
zen? Has anyone ever thought 
that the State could force a man 
to undergo surgery for appendi­
citis, because he was in danger of 
death without it? Furthermore, in 
the transfusion case, there is also 
at stake the right of conscience. 
Someone may object: If the 
State has the power to ·make at­
tempted suicide a crime and to 
prevent a person from committing 
suicide, then, a pa·ri, it should 
have the power of forcing a trans­
fusion on an unwilling. conscien­
tious objector. For to refuse the 
transfusion is the equivalent of 
committing suicide. In our opinion 
there is no adequate parity be­
tween the two cases. The person· 
who commits suicide violates a 
negative precept of the law of 
God: "Thou shalt not kill." The 
moral situ�tion of one who fails 
to take affirmative measures to 
keep himself alive is quite differ­
ent, especially when the measures 
concerned are artificial. surgical 
procedures. It is not inconceivable 
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that there should exist a legal tra­dition of obligatory self-preserva­tion, a tradition which would im­pose the affirmative legal duty oftaking certain minimum measuresto stay alive-for instance to takefood and drink. But I find it hardto conceive a theory of jurispru­dence in which the State wouldbe empowered to impose on mean affirmative legal duty to makeuse of highly developed surgicaltechniques in order to prolong myearthly existence. To kill oneselfis one thing. Not to avail oneselfof surgery is quite another. 
Finally, in the case of the child,I believe the State is justified inintervening and giving a neces­sary transfusion, even if the par-. ents object on religious grounds.First, because the child has a cer­tain, objective right to life and toordinary medical care to preservelife, no matter what its parents'mistaken beliefs may be. Second­ly, where there is a clear-cut caseof necessity, to save an innocentperson from impending death, theState can intervene even at the
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expense of the erroneous con -
science. Thirdly, no one object; 
to the power of the State to sup · 
ply for the neglect of the parent, 
in other, lesser matters. If th · 
parents are cruel or sufficient!· 
negligent of health, education o ·
morals, the State, for the good c · 
the child, can remove it -from th 
custody of the parents for ex 
tended or indefinite periods. /­
fortiori it should be empowered tc 
save the child's life by seeing tha 
it receives a necessary transfusion 
This rather long inquiry intc 
the scriptural, moral, legal anc 
public policy aspects of the trans­
fusion case is justified, I hope, b} 
the importance of the problems i1 
raises. Not the least among therr 
is the very human one of dealing 
with the stubborn sincerity of thf 
Witness. I suggest patience, when 
their intransigence becomes irri­
tating, and still more patience 
when their mistaken zeal attacks 
the Church of Christ. Our hos­
pitals and physicians can show 
them by example that the charity 
of Christ is all-embracing. 
LINACRE QUARTERLY 
Catholic Teaching Hospitals 
FRANK B. McGLONE, M. D. 
MANY of .the b�st general hos­pitals m this country areconducted u n d e r  Catholic aus­
pices. But proportionately few of 
t h o s e  Catholic institutions are 
conspicuous for their teaching 
programs. That deficiency �s to our discredit and to our. disad­
vantage. To our discredit. be­
cause it is in direct contrast to the 
role which the Church has always 
played in the propagation of sci­
entific truth; to our disadvantage, 
because we are thereby ignoring 
one· of the best means at our dis­
posal for insuring the excellence 
of medical standards in our hos­
pitals for the future. 
The tremendous good which is 
accomplished in our Catholic hos­
pitals-thanks largely to the �n­selfish devotion of our nursmg 
sisters and hospital chaplains, and 
to the very practical faith of Cath­
alic doctors and nurses-is none­
theless so common a thing as to 
be legitimately taken for granted. 
But it often comes as a surprise to 
Catholic and non-Catholic alike to 
discover that the religious con­
cerns of the Catholic hospital tend 
to improve rather than to dil�tethe quality of medical care wh.1chour patients receive. The eth1Cal 
codes of our hospitals, for exam­
ple, are faithfully enforced and 
have always forbidden those med­
ical abuses which elsewhere are 
most frequently the obstacles to 
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proper accreditation. Because our 
moral standards are so high. we 
are fortunately free from the be­
ginning of such abuses. Or to put 
it another way, it is easier to prac­
tice good medicine in our hospitals 
because we are irrevocably com­
mitted to a sound morality. 
Who else, then, is in better po­
sition to train the young physician 
to the highest medical standards? 
And what better reason for adopt­
ing an educational program than 
that we are most advantageously 
situated for the inculcation of 
what is best in medicine? The 
hospital. the staff, the trainee, an? 
the patient - all stand to profit 
from such a program. And con­
versely, they stand to lose with­
out one. 
Our interest in medical educa­
tion in private hospitals has been 
inspired by the growth of a fine 
program in Denver over the past. ht years. During that lengtheig 
· H ·t I of time at St. Joseph s osp1 a . 
the house staff has increased from 
·x to twelve interns, with elevenSI . . residents on the various se�v1ces,
all actively engaged in t:�chmg orlearning the best med1Cme. s�r­
gery, pathology, and obstetrics.
The development of the program
was slow during the first few
years, chiefly because th� . staffwas not eager to partic1p�te.Now, however, with a stimulat'.ngprogram well established, teachmg 
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